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Introduction
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) typically provide small loans to poor women to support income-generating activities which can promote health through poverty reduction and female empowerment. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] Many believe that combining microfinance with health promotion such as health education and community mobilisation (CM) is a promising approach to maximising health gains [6] [7] [8] [9] . However, many MFIs emphasise specialisation in credit delivery, arguing that providing additional services might undermine financial sustainability. [10, 11] Evidence to inform these debates is lacking.
Little is known about the effects of combining microfinance with health promotion, about the feasibility of delivering such programmes or their accessibilty and acceptability to clients.
Poverty, entrenched gender inequalities and lack of community cohesion support high levels of intimate partner violence (IPV) and HIV transmission in rural South Africa. [12] The Intervention with Microfinance for AIDS and Gender Equity (IMAGE) combines microfinance, gender/HIV-awareness training (Sisters for Life, SFL), and CM in an attempt to tackle these health issues in this setting [4] . Details of the intervention components are provided in Table 1 . Table 1 here
We conducted a cluster-randomised trial of IMAGE from 2001-2004 and subsequently scaled-up delivery during [2005] [2006] [2007] . We collected data on health outcomes during the trial and have collected process data throughout, guided by a conceptual framework [13] . During the trial process data were principally intended to supplement outcome data by examining fieldstaff's and participants' perspectives on the intervention and exploring possible causal pathways. As scale-up commenced we decided to collect further retrospective data on delivery during the trial as well as prospective process evaluation data from managers, fieldstaff and clients. [14] This new data collection occurred during
2005-2007.
In the trial IMAGE was associated with a significant reduction in IPV and sexual risk behaviour among IMAGE clients but there was little evidence of an impact on condom use or HIV incidence among young people in clients' households or communities [4, 15, 16] . This paper explores the feasibility of IMAGE delivery and the accessibility and acceptability of IMAGE for intended clients [17] . Feasibility refers to the practicality of delivering the intervention as intended, accessibility to whether the intervention reached and fully involved intended clients and acceptability the extent to which clients found participation satisfactory. [17] We discuss the relevance of our findings to debates about the merits of 'linked' and 'parallel' models of inter-sectoral collaboration [18] . We also consider whether our findings on process help explain the outcomes observed in the IMAGE trial and their relevance for potential replication of IMAGE in other settings.
Methods

Setting
IMAGE was delivered in South Africa's impoverished but rapidly developing Limpopo province. [19, 20] An established non-profit organisation, the Small Enterprise 'linked' delivery model [18] , with staff from the two specialist organisations delivering services to the same clients. During scale-up, a 'parallel' delivery model [18] was tried, where both sets of staff were, to some extent, managed by one organisation (SEF).
Figure here
Data collection
We conducted a multi-method process evaluation drawing on nine data collection modules, the timing of which are shown in the Figure registers were kept to provide data on recruitment, dropout and attendance of the intervention to examine accessibility. During this period we explored intervention feasibility and acceptability via qualitative data from researchers' notes on 134 hours of observation of intervention delivery covering the full SFL curriculum in the first four loan centres enrolled, intervention provider diaries (n=4), focus-group discussions with clients (n=16) and semi-structured interviews with clients who dropped out of the programme after completing a loan cycle (n=19 [23] .Thus, our analysis incorporated the 'top-down' structure of research questions and the 'grounded' voices of informants. [24] Quantitative indicators of accessibility and acceptability were analysed using Stata 9
(STATACorp, TX). Attendance at each of 10 SFL sessions was recorded for all 430
clients included in the trial [4] , thus data on 4300 client-sessions were potentially available and data were actually available on 3986 of these. Monthly dropout from the programme was calculated as the proportion of clients completing loan repayments each month who did not apply for a new loan [25] . Statements regarding acceptability of IMAGE to clients were coded on a four-point scale and distributions of client responses are presented here.
Results
How feasible was IMAGE to deliver?
Project initiation
Interviews with SEF and RADAR managers revealed that RADAR initiated the linked partnership, co-ordinated funding arrangements and led the design of SFL and CM. SEF came to the partnership with experience of successfully delivering microfinance. Despite previous reluctance to engage in collaborations SEF managers were keen to collaborate with RADAR. This was in part because SEF was becoming more financially stable, but also because SEF managers were increasingly concerned about HIV/AIDS among their clients and staff. Further, SEF managers were impressed by RADAR and were holding some funds to address HIV/AIDS but had no plans for these. SEF saw the proposal as low-risk since RADAR would manage the new components (quote 1), and because the programme could be implemented in a new branch (A), the establishment of which could draw on the HIV/AIDS funding. Importantly, RADAR also did not propose to make any major changes to SEF's delivery model (quote 2).
[1] The cost was a big issue. That was the main issue. And we realised that it would not add any cost to our program, that all the people that will be involved [SEF and SFL staff] would be fully paid from [RADAR] . (SEF manager)
[2] We did not want to disrupt SEF's core activities-microfinance is a tough business so we didn't want to disturb what they were doing and we just wanted to make sure that our relationship with them was smooth. (RADAR manager)
Management and implementation during the trial
During the trial, RADAR managed SFL and CM. Four trainers (all women, one openly living with HIV) were recruited and trained by an external consultant. This was intensive and focused on faciliatation skills and reflection about one's own circumstances followed by practice sessions (quote 3). Trainers found all these of value.
[3] It is knowing that as a trainer you have to present very well, we have to be presentable, you have to be at the side of the flip chart…talk loudly…it was very stressful because we didn't know what to do.
[ … ] The training was so intense. It had everything to do with the sessions and everything to do with every faculty of your life. You had to be very aware of yourself before you could actually educate someone else. (SFL field staff)
Ten SFL sessions were delivered in each of the ten loan centres. Selected women from each loan-centre were then identified by peers as 'natural leaders' (n=37) and were trained to lead their centres in CM to address priorities identified by clients. Natural leaders were expected to have actively participated during SFL sessions and have good interpersonal and problem-solving skills, although the selection process was determined by clients and differed between centres. Interviews with clients and fieldstaff revealed that CM unfolded in two ways during the trial: individual information-sharing and collective action. Individual information-sharing (e.g. telling one's children about HIV and safer sex) was widespread, whereas collective action ( e.g. formation of a a rape committee, workshops on HIV, various marches) was more limited. Reasons for this are discussed later.
SEF managed and successfully implemented the microfinance programme. During the trial unrepaid debt from 'Branch A' totalled less than 100USD from some 290,000USD
disbursed. Microfinance performance in the trial was considered good even by SEF's high standards. Managers reported that SEF fieldworkers working on IMAGE were among the highest performing across SEF. Their collaboration with SFL was suggested as one possible reason for this success, though it was recognised this was difficult to prove (quote 4).
[4] Every year we do award the best [microfinance field-staff]. It is a very competitive award and all [the fieldworkers] from [Branch A] came first. I think it was unbelievable and actually remarkable. I think the fact that they came first was related to the fact that they were part of the IMAGE project. I do not know whether it was something that they were doing on a day to day basis or was it something that had to do with their personalities or their own abilities. (SEF manager)
SEF and SFL managers cited several factors as promoting successful delivery during the trial. These included: RADAR garnering SEF management support by raising awareness of the inter-relationship of poverty, IPV and HIV among clients; intensive training for SFL staff provided by an expert consultant; and. on-going support for trainers provided by RADAR management. One challenge during this phase was that SFL trainers had access to infrastructure support in the form of office computers and a team car which created tensions with SEF staff who used public transport and saw working conditions as somewhat unequal.
Intervention management and delivery during scale-up
Following the trial, management interviews showed that enthusiasm for IMAGE led the partners to plan the scale-up. RADAR managers felt long-term service delivery was outside their remit so the organizations decided to explore SEF managing SFL and CM in parallel with microfinance in the scale-up (quote 5).
[ Registers showed that clients attended a median of 8/10 SFL sessions (interquartile range 5-10). Of all client-sessions on which data were available 2790/3986 (70.0%) were attended, 532 (13.4%) were missed due to non-attendance by current members, while 277 (7.0%) were not attended due to individuals having left SEF and 387 (9.7%) due to
individuals not yet having joined by that session. Attendance was lowest among women under 35 years of age who were most likely to drop out of the programme (table 2) .
Although quantitative data for attendance during scale-up is not available, qualitative data suggest overall patterns of attendance were similar. The reliance of SFL on successful microfinance functioning was highlighted when attendance at 'Branch B' was reduced by changes to the way that loans were repaid.
Clients valued SFL, particularly the focus on communication, new information, social support and increasing confidence (quote 11 and table 3).
[10] Because of poverty I used the loan meant for business to buy food, pay school fees and uniforms for children …and ended up with no money to buy stock. (Client) [11] My children are beginning to understand me better and I now know how to live with them peacefully. They slowly are opening up. Hence I am grateful of health talks because they have helped me. My children are listening to me. (Client) Table 3 here SFL trainers were considered highly skilled (table 3) . Only a minority of clients expressed concerns in interviews about sessions being too long, content being inappropriate or confusing, trainers being too young or SFL being compulsory (quote 12).
[12] At some point I even told the facilitators that I did not join SEF for health education but for money. "Where does all this health education stuff come from?", I asked. (Client)
SFL trainers outlined factors that they considered influenced clients' satisfaction with the programme. These included recruiting trainers locally so they understood clients' lives and ongoing mentoring which enabled personal reflection and helped them connect with clients. A shift to less intensive mentoring by senior trainers (rather than external consultants) may have contributed to a reported reduction in trainer morale at certain points in the scale-up. Interviews with scale-up clients The perception that SEF fieldworkers supported SFL was also important and engaging both groups of staff in joint activities helped promote collaboration. During the trial, enthusiasm for the SFL programme was occasionally undermined by SEF clients being unaware that SFL and CM were a compulsory condition of membership. During scale-up, clients were clearly informed about both programmes when they joined.
Acccessibility and Acceptability of CM
Structured interview data showed that women who took part in the 'natural leaders' training were most often 35-44 years of age and were more educated than average (table 2) . Focus group discussions showed that this training was a source of confidence for those clients who took part (quote 13), but barriers such as sickness, constraints from husbands, childcare and the pressures of running a business meant that some women regarded as potential 'natural leaders' were unable to participate (quote 14).
[13] The power that those women have after being identified as Natural Leaders; they went into training and I mean they were very different -that week changed them quite a lot. And I have seen them in action in the centre meetings after they return from the training.
(Client)
[14] Client #1 (older): I have recently had an operation and I think it is not going to be healthy for if I expose myself for winds out there. The winds will make me sick. Another thing is I am taking care of my school-going children. Client #2 (younger): I am staying with my husband. Unfortunately I cannot go. Client #3 (older): I would love to but I have a problem because I will have [to get] someone who can help to sell my stuff so that when we get back I will be able to repay my loan.
In the structured interviews most clients reported that they participated in CM (table 3) , and acts of individual information-sharing were widespread (quote 15).
[15] As parents we were not taught to talk about sexual matters with our children. But the scourge of the virus is challenging every parent to open up and talk. It is difficult but it is something we have to face head on. As women and mothers and grandmothers we have the responsibility to protect our children against the virus. (Client)
However, barriers to widespread participation in collective action were noted in qualitative data. Some 'natural leaders' were proactive, while others required ongoing support from SFL trainers over 6-9 months to help plan collective action (quote 16). In 'Branch A', CM occurred in the scale-up much as it had in the trial with more focus on individual rather than collective action. However, in 'Branch B', CM was delayed as a result of the problems with microfinance, and it was decided that CM would commence only with the strongest centres in this Branch.
Discussion
Summary of findings
We conclude that it is feasible to deliver gender/HIV training and CM alongside microfinance with impoverished clients without undermining microfinance delivery or repayment. Our evaluation also suggested contextual factors that supported successful delivery of these interventions. IMAGE was delivered by an MFI and an academic unit. A linked delivery model worked well during the trial during which microfinance and SFL proved feasible to deliver and accessible and acceptable to clients. However, during CM, 
Limitations
We attempted to collect quantitative data on accessibility and acceptability from all trial clients and were able to follow-up 87.9% of these. However the views of those who were not interviewed may have differed from those who were. We were not able to assess quantitatively the accessibility or acceptability of training or CM during the scale-up phase, and time restrictions meant we were not able to document fully the delayed rollout of CM through 'Branch B'. Further, although all programme staff were interviewed, qualitative interviews in both phases were conducted with a small, albeit random, sample of clients whose views may have been unrepresentative of the majority. Interviews might also have focused on problems more than successes and these may be overemphasised in our analysis. Our detailed observation of intervention delivery focused on the first four centres recruited during the trial. The experience of these centres might also not have been representative since a great amount of energy went into refining the intervention during this phase. However, these centres also highlighted many problems with intervention delivery that were later resolved.
Implications for research
Our finding that the microfinance and training components were largely delivered as planned, with high levels of client satisfaction and participation, lends plausibility to the outcome of reduced IPV and sexual risk behaviour among direct intervention recipients. [4, 26] This supports previous work where we have documented pathways through which impacts might have been achieved [16, 27] . We found some evidence that contrary to the concern that implementing the combined IMAGE intervention might negatively influence microfinance performance, SEF staff working on IMAGE outperformed other SEF staff. Future research should clarify the potential synergies between health and development projects. 
Implications for policy
Regarding IMAGE's potential to be replicated in other settings, it was important that the partnership involved a successful and financially sustainable microfinance organisation working in a developing economic environment. Other attempts by HIV/AIDS researchers to partner with microfinance and offer credit alongside other activities have been less successful [30, 31] . Reasons for the failure of these projects remain unclear but may include the stagnant economic climate in Zimbabwe (both projects cited) and the targetting of young women at high-HIV-risk who may not make optimal microfinance clients. The decision not to change SEF's microfinance delivery model appears to have been key in supporting the delivery of IMAGE, although, as described above, the fact that young people were under-represented likely contributed to the lack of overall impact on HIV-risk among this group.
IMAGE employed a linked delivery model in the trial, moved to a parallel model during scale-up and finally settled on a linked model with a non-academic partner for future work. Within the microfinance literature, the parallel model has received more attention than the linked model [32] . Some practitioners even argue that a 'unified' model, involving a single staff-member delivering both credit and education, is preferable to both because linked and parallel approaches are inherently unsustainable due to grant dependency. [18] IMAGE's linked model allowed components to be delivered by specialised staff with long health education sessions based on clear theoretical approaches [33] . However, the significant input required meant that neither an academic unit nor a specialised MFI were prepared to take on management. Interestingly, two major MFIs have recently launched linked model programs after many years of using unified and parallel approaches [34] . Future research is needed to demonstrate the extent to which these linked models are indeed sustainable and of high-quality.
Conclusion
The IMAGE study was a rare attempt to design and rigorously evaluate a complex intervention involving microfinance and health promotion components in a low-income setting. Our process evaluation is intended to complement the outcome evaluation and maximise learning from the trial and subsequent scale-up. We have focused on the delivery and uptake of the intervention components, and our findings suggest the programme was largely feasible, accessible and acceptable. We provide a plausible explanation for why some of the intervention's intended outcomes were achieved in the trial, while others were not. We also highlight that while microfinance holds great promise as a mechanism for achieving health gains in marginalised populations, finding optimal models for delivering combined microfinance and health promotion will require operational research and ongoing innovation. 
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